Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
Other sub-techniques of Supply Chain Compromise (3)
|VT0004.001||Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools|
|VT0004.002||Compromise Software Supply Chain|
|VT0004.003||Compromise Hardware Supply Chain|
Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by the end user for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply Chain Compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.
APT17 is suspected to be the APT group behind the supply chain compromise of CCleaner and the distribution of the backdoored version to over 2 million CCleaner users.
ShadowHammer refers to a backdoor inserted in a Software Supply Chain Compromise to ASUS Live Update Utility and delivered to over a million ASUS users.
ShadowPad backdoor was inserted into a dynamic link library (dll) file of NetSarang, a server management software and delivered to NetSarang's users in a Software Supply Chain Compromise.
Winnti Group targets the development pipeline of gaming and adware software companies to backdoor the software and compromise the Supply Chain
A patch management process should be implemented to check unused applications, unmaintained and/or previously vulnerable software, unnecessary features, components, files, and documentation.
Continuous monitoring of vulnerability sources and the use of automatic and manual code review tools should also be implemented as well.
Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity.
- Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
- Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
- Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019.
- Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.
- Rosenberg, J. (2017, September 20). Evidence Aurora Operation Still Active: Supply Chain Attack Through CCleaner. Retrieved February 13, 2018.
- Counter Threat Research Team. (2017, June 28). NotPetya Campaign: What We Know About the Latest Global Ransomware Attack. Retrieved June 11, 2020.
- Cherepanov, A.. (2017, June 30). TeleBots are back: Supply chain attacks against Ukraine. Retrieved June 11, 2020.
- CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021.
- FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.
- OWASP. (2018, February 23). OWASP Top Ten Project. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
Created: 01 December 2020
Last Modified: 27 December 2020